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The Protection 
of Individual Members 
of Unions 
E.E. Palmer 
The author discusses the analysis and recommenda-
tions jound in the Woods* Report on the position of the 
individual member of the union. He views the investigation 
into the rights of individuals in two parts : ( 1 ) the extent 
to which unions are granted exclusive control over employ-
ment conditions and (2) the extent to which the services 
provided by such unions are vital to Us members. Solutions 
to the problems inhérent in individual member versus union 
conflicts cannot be found in appeals to abstract 'demo-
cracy', internai reform or changes in the common law, 
but through législation. 
The singling out of the rights of individuals in unions for discussion 
tends to create the impression that unions hâve been blameworthy in their 
actions in this field. I believe further comments are warranted. 
Specifically, it cannot be overstated that in my research I unearthed 
substantial évidence that unions hâve acted arbitrarily with regard to 
their members in any but a few isolated cases. This does not, of course, 
mean that the problem was not worthy of study. Quite the contrary. The 
présent position of unions under modem collective bargaining législation 
requires that ail possible steps be taken to insure that the position of 
members of unions meet standards generally acceptable in today's com-
munity. 
Before examining what the Task 
Force, in fact, has recommended 
and my views thereon, I would like 
to make certain preliminary com-
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ments. First, I would like to say that the two central features of any in-
vestigation of the rights of individual employées affected by a collective 
bargaining régime are the extent to which unions, as certified bargaining 
agents, hâve been granted exclusive control over employment conditions 
in the bargaining unit and the extent to which the services provided by 
such unions are vital to its members. The first of thèse points is illustrated 
by the fact that the union is the sole party able to negotiate a labour agree-
ment : there is no room left for private negotiation between employer 
and employée. As has been stated : " . . . (A) stockholder of a corpo-
ration, if dissatisfied with its management, can sell his stock and invest 
elsewhere ; a member of a union can resign — and starve". The latter 
point has two aspects : first, the kinds and extent of activities of unions 
hâve undergone substantial changes in récent years — "fringe" économie 
benefits are burgeoning and political involvement has increased ; and, se-
cond, the significance of thèse benefits to members and non-members of 
unions has heightened as job mobility has lessened in the face of auto-
mation and the économie costs of hiring older employées. Thus, it can 
readily be seen that not only the mère fact of membership, but also the 
extent to which an individual member can participate in and control union 
activities, is of far greater import by reason of the évolution of the rôle 
of unions in society. 
Given thèse points, the resolution of their inhérent difficulties by 
the Task Force was a prodigious task. It was made even more difficult, 
however, by the prolifération of union security législation which, in some 
cases, has made employment dépendent upon union membership and by 
a continuation of the judicial policy of non-intervention in matters of 
union membership. Obviously, certain inequities has been created by this 
situation and thèse hâve corne under attack from various quarters. 
As noted, basic to the work of the Task Force has been the fact that 
thèse changes hâve resulted in criticism of union security being continually 
placed before the layman and persons actively engaged in labour work. 
Thèse critics demand abolition or drastic modification of the présent si-
tuation, because they claim that it gives union leaders too much power 
and thus saps the vitality of the labour movement ; that workers are left 
at the mercy of capricious union rules, and that, generally, the individual 
is not given his "fair, démocratie rights". In rebuttal, proponents of union 
security stated that union security was an aid to the individual because it 
increased his influence vis-à-vis his employer and gives him greater job 
security ; and, to the extent that individual workers' freedom is limited, 
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such limitations were inévitable in a démocratie society and the logical con-
comitant of the right of certified unions to be the exclusive bargaining agent 
of ail workers in the bargaining unit. As an économie argument they also 
point to the advantage of having stable, industry-wide unions with whom 
management can negotiate agreements. On a less sophisticated level, it has 
been stated that ail workers should pay for the advantages gained by unions 
and that opposition to union security was merely a front for anti-union 
drives. Underlying thèse arguments, no doubt, is the traditional antipathy 
of the trade union movement toward any outside intervention in its intern-
ai affairs. In short, however, the real point seems to be whether économie 
convenience or untrammelled individual rights prevail. The dilemma that 
faced the Task Force, therefore, was one of deciding which of the two 
propositions above to accept, or alternatively, to balance the need to main-
tain union unity in respect of its qualities as a bargaining agent with that 
of retaining freedom of the individual to obtain work. 
Upon examination, it seems clear to me that unionists are correct 
in claiming that some form of union security is an économie necessity ; 
their arguments do not obtain the same degree of success with respect to 
the continuation of the slight protection afforded employées in a pre-
collective bargaining era when unions were placed in the same category 
as social clubs and the policy followed by the courts was one of non-inter-
vention in their private affairs. At that time, except for requiring unions 
to adhère to their constitutions, little or no protection was afforded the 
individual member. Obviously, such an approach was inadéquate to deal 
with the changing économie realities outlined above. As a rather belated 
resuit, législation was passed which prevented unions from discriminating 
against a person on the basis of his race, colour, national origin or religion 
in their membership practice. But this protection was, and is, woefully 
weak as a remedy for the individual worker who had been discriminated 
against in less obvious ways than in the mère fact of membership and on 
the basis of factors other than those dealt with in the législation. It did 
not protect what might be called the quality of union membership, the 
right to take part in union affairs without fear of reprisai, and the right 
to be fairly represented by the union. 
It was and is clear to me as, I believe, it was clear to the Task Force 
that as long as the économie objectives of union security were maintained, 
trade unions could claim no inhérent sanctity from outside interférence 
in this area. Therefore, circumstances necessitated changes in this area of 
the law. The problem lay in the formulation of a System of guidelines 
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or rules which, while protecting the individual, were not detrimental to 
the effective use of union bargaining power. 
The Task Force was also faced with a décision as to the policy which 
should be followed in deciding upon the nature of such change. Hère two 
major schools of thought exist as to the policy which should underlie 
approaches to union government : the view that it should be modelled 
on "démocratie" principles to the fullest possible extent ; and the position 
that union government should be tailored to assist the achievement of a 
central goal of a union — better collective agreements for its members. 
The first of thèse approaches needs little in the way of expansion on 
the nature of the argument : it generally assumes that the démocratie sauce 
for the Canadian goose is equally satisfactory for the union gander. 
Several arguments are made against this type of approach by the 
functionalist. The first, which would seem to be unanswerable, is that 
democracy is not an end in itself to be gained by the labour movement, 
but that better working conditions are. Consequently, it is agreed, stress on 
means should not be detrimental to the end sought. In other words, the 
end of trade union activity is to protect and improve the gênerai living 
standards of its members and not to provide the workers with an exercise 
in self-government. 
The second Une of argument stresses the inapplicability of démocratie 
concepts to the trade union movement. Generally, the point is made that 
democracy has been created to provide government for a society whose 
aims are diverse and its compoments disparate ; therefore, because the 
ambit of objectives in unions is narrow and its membership homogeneous, 
the démocratie function does not follow the union form. 
In fact, democracy, as an abstract goal, has not flourished in unions, 
except on rare occasions and at the grass roots level. Nor can it be said to 
be a necessary concomitant of union organization. Consequently, to swal-
low this libertarian argument holus bolus is wrong. This is not to say 
that ail the points put forward above are right. Clearly, for example, it 
does not follow that there are no distinct and strongly-held différences of 
opinion merely because the ranks of unions corne from, on the whole, the 
same class, and that the décisions they must make ail fall within a fairly 
narrow and related range. Thus, there are areas where démocratie prin-
ciples may provide a basis for union government and, perhaps, the prima 
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jade assumption should be that they should apply unless conclusive argu-
ments to the contrary are brought forward ; but still there are areas where 
an excess of democracy will assist no one — the union as an entity, the 
employer, the industry, the country as a whole, or, indeed, the workers 
themselves. In thèse latter situations, démocratie scruples hâve no place : 
in a political democracy, not ail of its components should be required to 
mirror this philosophy. It is sufficient to recognize the union's quasi-public 
nature without making it into a micro-cosmic democracy. Nevertheless, 
no one can deny that unions should at least be responsible and responsive 
to the rank and file of its members. Perhaps the Donovan Commission 
Report, where emphasis is placed on procédural protection rather than 
on "démocratie" reforms, is the approach to take. Certainly, there is room 
to suspect that this is what the Task Force did. 
The method of approach to solve thèse problems also raises some 
difficulties. Without delving too deeply into the problem it seems clear 
that the solutions cannot corne either from requests for internai reform or 
from changes in the common law — indépendance and history militate 
against such a possibility. The change, therefore, must be made through 
législation, i.e., by requiring trade unions to conform to statutory stan-
dards of behavior. Again, the Task Force appears to hâve accepted this 
position. 
On this point certain observations seem relevant. First, législation 
must start with the realization that employers wish to deal only with 
unions and a remedy which merely permits individual employées to by-
pass the union and to go to the employer in an illusory protection. Second, 
législation based on disclosure is doomed to failure. Historically, required 
public confessions of personal sin hâve revealed very few sinners. Finally, 
any législation proclaimed must at least meet with a modicum of union 
favour ; government fiât cannot work in this area without such support. 
As a gênerai matter, it would seem that the Labour Task Force con-
curred in thèse views. I believe, however, that I would differ in this appli-
cation from that actually achieved by the Task Force. 
An analysis of the position of an individual union member, it seems 
to me, should be divided into three areas : first, the reason that union 
membership is significant ; second, how one becomes and remains a mem-
ber of a union ; and third, what rights attach to such membership. As the 
Task Force's suggestions in this area are scattered in a rather random 
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fashion through their report, I will attempt to follow this order in picking 
out what I consider to be the highlights of it. 
Initially, I would therefore like to turn to the question of union secu-
rity. I do not believe I hâve to dwell on the more ephemeral aspects of this 
question. Specifically, it is my contention that one cannot deal satisfactorily 
with any other aspects of the gênerai problem of the rights of union mem-
bers until one has determined what the policy should be with regard to 
union security. In this respect it seems clear that most critics of union 
activities hâve rested their case, in part at least, on the possibility that 
présent législation permits a man's ability to work on a job to be inexora-
bly tied with union membership. Even without facts indicating that such 
provisions hâve been unreasonably used, the argument has great currency. 
In this area the Labour Task Force has made the following recom-
mendation : 
43. We recommend that the compulsory, irrévocable check-off of 
regular and reasonable dues be available to a certifiée! union as of 
right upon the négociation of its initial collective agreement and 
thereafter, and that this right be extended to a union recognized 
voluntarily by the employer. 
The Task Force would also permit more limited, i.e. stricter, forms of 
union security, requiring that loss of employment as a resuit of the trigger-
ing of such a clause should not occur until the employée involved has 
exhausted the appeal procédures involved, as set up by the union, and 
such further appeals as provided by the Report itself. In the latter situa-
tion the person involved would be suspended from the union but would 
still be compelled to pay dues and assessments until the matter was settled 
finally. 
The apparent basis for this décision lies in the view that the union, 
as exclusive bargaining authority for the employées, gives them "a claim 
to gênerai support from employées in the unit in the unions' capacity as 
their collective bargaining agent, whatever other functions it may perform 
as an instrument of social transformation". In short, the member is to 
pay "an agency fee" for services rendered by the union as its bargaining 
agent. 
I find that such an approach does not go as far as I would like to 
see. Specifically, I find it difficult to understand why the check-off envi-
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saged should only commence after the negotiation of an initial collective 
agreement. Surely, if the fee is for services rendered by the union, such 
services are being rendered before that time. Again, does this not intro-
duce, albeit on a lesser scale, the issue of union security into the bargain-
ing relationship ? In this regard, I realize that it is there now, but I find 
some difficulty in rationalizing companies as the defender of employées' 
libertarian instincts when a union security clause can be the lever in lower-
ing the wage package. 
Again, given the position the Task Force has taken, I can see no 
necessity for more stringent forms of union security. Once the union is 
assured that ail persons it represents will not be free riders, it seems un-
warranted to require that they also be actual members of the union. Only 
incidentally need I mention that the existence of such a recommendation 
strengthens the argument that far more intervention is necessary in the 
internai affairs of the union. 
In short, therefore, I feel now, and did in my report to them, that the 
Task Force should hâve recommended that upon certification or voluntary 
récognition by an employer, the union should be entitled as a matter of 
right to a compulsory irrévocable check-off of regular and reasonable dues 
from ail employées in the bargaining unit affected. However, I would pro-
hibit union security clauses which are more limited. 
On my analysis, therefore, the Task Force's recommendations on 
union security hâve done little to effect the importance of the right to 
join and remain a member of a union. Consequently, their recommen-
dations in this latter area are of great significance. 
As noted earlier, there is little protection presently afforded members 
or prospective members of unions by law. Generally, the law has not ad-
vanced to the position where membership in a union is considered any 
differently from that of membership in a private club. Hence, existing rules 
in this area reflect a reliance upon raditional doctrines of contract which, 
given the inhérent superior position of an organization over an individual 
in this area, can only act to the détriment of the individual. Although 
the Task Force realizes that the underlying assumptions of the courts are 
incorrect, it appears to me to provide too little in the way of change. 
Specifically, the Task Force almost entirely neglects the control of a union 
over the qualifications it can impose for membership. Specifically, the 
Task Force only makes recommendations that "Where access to a parti-
cular trade, occupation or industry, is contingent upon the attainment of 
90 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 25, NO 1 
certain minimum standards of competency in order to protect the public 
interest, [they] recommend a standard to be set and administered by a 
tribunal in which there is a public participation and from whose décision 
there is a right of appeal". Presumably such appeal is to a Public Review 
Board or a Labour Relations Board. Again, a similar board would be 
empowered to détermine the reasonableness of dues and allied assessments. 
Finally, in the case where a member was to hâve his membership suspend-
ed or terminated, a similar board was to hâve jurisdiction to détermine the 
reasonableness of the substantive rules upon which the union based its ter-
mination of membership. In this area the board indicates that such rules 
"should not be such as to preclude union members from engaging in other-
wise lawful conduct unless that conduct seriously undermines the union's 
position as a bargaining agent." 
Quite obviously, such recommendations suffer from at least one se-
rious flaw : they do not in any way touch upon the rules which should 
govern the initial application for membership by a prospective member. 
As the only protection now existing appears to be relatively weak, this 
failure seems especially great. Consequently, in my opinion, the recom-
mendation made by the Labour Task Force to insure that the substantive 
rules relating to membership be reasonable should be extended to cases 
where persons are denied membership as well. 
Another questionable area of this recommendation relates to the 
dependence of the Task Force on Public Review Boards. While clearly 
the board established by the UAW has had a good deal of success in its 
activities, it is questionable that such groups could adequately deal with 
ail problems that exist. Such boards suffer from the fact that they are a 
final appellate body and so only come into action when the internai re-
médies provided by the union constitution hâve been exhausted. Again, 
I doubt whether sufficient boards could be found to deal adéquate with 
ail problems that would exist. The work of such boards is of an extremely 
délicate nature and, as anyone in the labour field realizes, manpower of 
this calibre is rather difficult to come by. I cannot see the Canada Labour 
Relations Board, the alternate suggestion of the Task Force, being suitable 
at ail. 
What does hâve appeal, however, is a législative statement of the 
scope of permissible conduct for unions in this area. Such an approach, 
it seems to me, would bring the problems home to unions before diffi-
culties arose and thus obviate the necessity in many cases for ex post 
facto adjudication of the correctness of certain rules. 
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Such a recommendation has been made by the Task Force with 
regard to the procédures by which such rules are presently dealt. Thus 
they hâve recommended "that législation prescribe basic procédural rights 
in internai union affairs, including the right to be heard, to be tried by 
an impartial body, to be represented by counsel, to be protected against 
double jeopardy, to hâve access to a speedy trial and appeal, and to re-
ceive a reasoned décision." No one could cavil with thèse recommenda-
tions. It is to be hoped that they could be extended further. To me, such 
a task seems relatively simple and extremely valuable. 
The Task Force seems to hâve been exceptionally successful in its 
dealings with what might be called the "quality of union membership". In 
this area, the board made a worthwhile step into the internai affairs of 
the union when they recommended that : 
« [Législation guarantee to members the right to run for union office 
in élections held at regular intervais, to nominate candidates, to vote 
in union affairs, to attend and participate in union meetings, and to 
hâve equal access to union facilities, including the union newspaper, 
especially during élection campaigns. We recommend further that 
législation guarantee the right of union members to audit statements 
of union financial affairs and the possession of the union constitution, 
and the right of ail employées in the bargaining unit to possession 
of any collective agreement affecting their employment. > 
Quite obviously, most of thèse rights are presently afforded to mem-
bers of unions. It does, however, provide a clear statement of rights which 
will be instructive to those persons who hâve not considered this problem, 
but are of good will. As well, it has a useful cautionary influence on those 
who do not. I can see no argument whatsoever against such a position. 
In a more substantive way, the report of the Task Force also dealt 
with the problem of ratification and strike votes as well as political action. 
In the case of both ratification and strike votes, the report takes a 
similar tack. Noting the public interest in both thèse matters, the Task 
Force seeks to ensure that a thoroughly représentative judgment of the 
union members involved will be attained. Therefore, they recommend that 
such votes be taken by secret ballot and that the voters hâve maximum 
access to this ballot. To this end they recommend that the vote be taken 
at the entrance to the work place or places or by mail and that steps be 
taken to insure the secrecy of the ballot and that the employer's right to 
put his views to the persons involved be preserved. In the case of strike 
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votes, the board adds the rider that thèse be taken only after a time when 
it is legally possible to strike. In neither case does the Task Force require 
that such votes be mandatory. 
However there are two questions about thèse recommendations. 
First, should such votes be mandatory ? And second, should non-members 
of the union who are employed in the bargaining unit be entitled to vote 
in such élections ? The first of thèse queries is only tentative, - I am 
not too sure that in fact there should be any change. The second does, 
however, appear more arguable. Clearly, under présent circumstances 
thèse persons are affected by the décision to strike or ratify immediately 
as union members and, given the implication of the Task Force's other 
recommendations that they might not in fact be able to be members, it 
might not seem impractical or unjust to hâve them vote on such matters. 
Perhaps the answer to both of thèse questions is that intervention to such 
a degree into areas, where hitherto the law has avoided, might be pré-
maturé. 
I would like to touch briefly upon the recommendation of the Task 
Force regarding the political activities of unions. Briefly, the Task 
Force adopted the British position in this area with an additional feature. 
Thus, they recommended that union monies only be used to support a 
political party when : ( 1 ) such décision was made or ratified by a duly 
constituted représentative body of the union ; (2) where ail such monies 
were kept and accounted for separately ; (3) where dissenting members 
were permitted to opt out of such contributions ; and (4) when members 
who did not wish to contribute would be able to opt out by notifying the 
union or by stating their désire to do so in a signed letter to the Canada 
Labour Relations Board. As a resuit of the opting out, the Task Force 
suggests that the funds involved revert to a gênerai operating fund. 
I concur with the Task Force's own observation that this is a cum-
bersome set of procédures. I do not agrée, however, that such a System 
is necessary to protect "union members who may hold divergent views" 
from the majority. To some extent, ail corporate activity — and hère I 
use the term corporate advisedly — entails that the minority of members 
support causes with which they are not in agreement. Such support, how-
ever, is almost always of a very minor nature and does not preclude more 
active participation in favour of such dissident's chosen position. The 
balancing of the two interests, it is my submission, does not favour the 
individual. It rather smacks of a tempest in a teapot. 
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There are variety of other recommandations contained in the La-
bour Task Force report which touch on the position of the individual 
member. However, I cannot go into thèse in détail, nor dwell on many of 
the points related to the matters discussed above. Thèse matters form 
the guts of the report and, my dissenting views notwithstanding, hold to-
gether very well. 
Having made such a statement and in the face of my earlier criti-
cisms, I believe I should conclude by making some comments on this 
point. Specifically, although I believe the Task Force could hâve gone 
further, I realize that I state this with the bias of an académie. The Task 
Force was obviously involved in an exercise of the possible — indeed, 
being académies, they probably bent over backwards to achieve a practical, 
workable report. This is not to say that the justification for this report is 
expediency. The points that they recommend are valuable and, facing a 
relatively new and increasing area of legitimate concern to the public, they 
hâve shown restraint in the face of temptation to experiment. I concède 
that such expérimentation is not justified, but, not being in a position 
where I can be held accountable, I am afraid I hâve succumbed to temp-
tation quite often in this field. I trust my fall from grâce has not clouded 
my twin observations that this is an admirable report and that concern 
with this area does not reflect adversely on the splendid work of most 
unions in this area. 
LA PROTECTION DES DROITS INDIVIDUELS 
DES MEMBRES D'UN SYNDICAT 
Sauf dans quelques cas isolés, les syndicats n'agissent pas d'une façon arbitraire 
à l'égard des droits de leurs membres : la législation qui régit la négociation collec-
tive moderne exige des syndicats le respect de certaines règles de comportement 
vis-à-vis leurs syndiqués. 
Deux aspects ressortent d'une enquête sur les droits individuels dans un syndicat : 
i) Les syndicats, en tant qu'agents de négociation accrédités, se sont vu ac-
cordé le contrôle exclusif des conditions d'emploi effectant les individus 
de leur unité de négociation. 
ii) Les services fournis par de tels syndicats sont d'une importance vitale 
pour leurs membres. 
Cette importance relève de l'évolution que connaissent depuis quelques années 
les syndicats dans leurs activités : leur rôle politique s'est accru. Ils tiennent compte 
maintenant de la nécessité d'avantages économiques complémentaires au salaire 
pour leurs membres. La valeur de ces avantages complémentaires pour les membres 
et non-membres des syndicats s'est accrue à mesure qu'il est devenu plus difficile 
de changer d'emploi face à l'automation, face aux coûts élevés rattachés à l'embau-
chage d'un travailleur plus âgé. 
L'Équipe spécialisée en relations du travail fit des recherches sur les questions 
de sécurité syndicale esquissée ci-haut. Des injustices ont été créées par ce système, 
et dénoncées par les parties lésées. 
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Les critiques de la présente situation en demandèrent l'abolition ou une modi-
fication radicale, puisqu'à leur avis les chefs syndicaux détenaient trop de pouvoir 
et avaient tendance à ne pas respecter les droits de l'individu. On se défendit en 
soutenant que la sécurité syndicale augmente l'influence possible de l'employé vis-à-
vis les patrons et lui donne une meilleure sécurité d'emploi. On démontra aussi les 
avantages d'avoir des syndicats stables couvrant des industries complètes, avec les-
quels les patrons pouvaient négocier des conventions collectives. Le dilemme touchant 
l'Équipe spécialisée en relations du travail consistait à choisir et approuver l'une 
de ces deux positions, ou à proposer un compromis : maintenir la sécurité syndicale 
et défendre en même temps la liberté de l'individu. La législation prohiba toute 
discrimination de race, de couleur, d'origine ou de religion, mais cette mesure 
s'avéra inadéquate dans les situations où l'individu se déclarait victime d'une dis-
crimination de nature moins évidente. 
Deux écoles de pensée majeures existent concernant la politique d'approche à 
la formation du gouvernement des syndicats : 
i) Il doit être formé le plus possible d'après des principes « démocratiques » ; 
ii) il doit être raffiné de façon à faciliter la poursuite d'un but central du 
syndicat — négociation de conventions collectives plus favorables à ses 
membres. 
L'Équipe spécialisée se pencha sur le point de vue « démocratique », et le point 
de vue « fonctionnel », et semble conclure en insistant plutôt sur une protection par 
des procédures légales que sur des réformes « démocratiques ». Ces changements 
doivent être effectués par une législation acceptée par les deux écoles. 
Pour notre part, nous croyons que : 
1) l'Équipe spécialisée néglige presque entièrement la question du contrôle 
que peut exercer un syndicat sur les qualifications requises pour être un 
de ses membres. 
2) Une trop grande dépendance vis-à-vis des comités publiques de revision 
ou du Conseil Canadien des Relations Ouvrières peut se produire pour 
résoudre les problèmes auxquels la constitution du syndicat ne peut re-
médier. 
Nous sommes d'accord avec la recommandation de l'Équipe spécialisée portant 
sur une législation qui définirait le champ des conduites permises à un syndicat dans 
ses affaires internes. Cette recommandation stipule que « la législation doit accorder 
plus de droits protégés par les règles de procédure aux individus dans les affaires 
internes des syndicats ». 
Sur la question des votes de ratification et de grève, le Rapport vise à assurer 
l'expression vraiment représentative des membres concernés du syndicat : Il recom-
mande que ces votes soient exprimés par un scrutin secret. Toutefois le vote dans 
les deux cas doit être facultatif. 
L'Équipe spécialisée adopte une position britannique modifiée sur la question 
des activités politiques des syndicats, avec des procédures de « non-implication » pour 
les membres dissidents qui ne veulent pas y apporter leur contribution. Nous ne 
croyons pas que ce système soit nécessaire pour protéger les opinions divergents 
d'une minorité. 
Nous nous devons de conclure que la discussion du rôle du membre du syndi-
cat en tant qu'individu, constitue une partie importante du Rapport de l'Équipe 
spécialisée en relations du travail. 
